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ABSTRACT 
The need for information sharing is a growing concern for many agencies 
in the homeland security field. As communities struggle to prepare for and 
respond to major incidents, information sharing between agencies is vital. Fusion 
centers developed around the law enforcement community, which has led to an 
information-sharing network that is exclusive. Non-law enforcement agencies 
such as Fire, EMS and Public Health that are charged with preparing for and 
responding to major incidents need the exchange of information as well. This 
thesis identifies several components that affect knowledge transfer. The human 
elements of Relationships, Trust, Megacommunities, Governance, and 
Leadership form the basis for successful information sharing networks. On this 
base, the technical components of the information-sharing network such as 
Standard Operating Procedures, Technology Standards, and Interoperability can 
be built. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The information sharing process between the law enforcement community 
and the non-law enforcement agencies across the country has not been fulfilling 
the needs of agencies who, traditionally, have not been involved in the gathering 
and dissemination of information to support intelligence. The two-way sharing of 
critical information between these agencies is not occurring on the level that it 
should be nationwide. The need for a new perspective on how those agencies 
that are part of the planning, preparation, response to and recovery from a 
terrorist attack or catastrophic disaster is now. Through an understanding about 
what is not occurring we can look to create a new vision about what should be 
happening. We must develop a system that allows information to flow without 
barriers. This system should enhance information gathering and dissemination 
both internally and externally. 
By conducting research that involved interviews of existing fusion center 
personnel and a survey of information collectors and consumers, information was 
gathered that supports the need for a new model. The information that was 
gathered indicated that there is little cross discipline interaction being conducted 
in the existing fusion centers. The majority of the information sharing that is 
taking place is done so on an informal basis through personal acquaintances not 
established networks. The research indicated that there is a real need to build a 
system that includes all of the agencies in the information sharing community and 
is not reliant on human intervention to ensure the information is transferred. 
Several of those interviewed were of the understanding that there were several 
barriers to information sharing that were internally generated and not driven by 
regulations or external requirements. Many of the respondents to the survey 
addressed concerns that much of the information that is gathered and housed 
within fusion centers is over classified. This issue creates a barrier that is often 
used to deny access by non-law enforcement agencies. When questioned, many 
of the fusion center personnel admitted that very few law enforcement officials 
xii 
posses any clearances above Law Enforcement Sensitive. In comparison, many 
fire chiefs, public health directors and other first responder agency 
administrators’ posses equal classifications. The perception of fusion center 
information sharing as a law enforcement function only is persistent in many of 
the first responder’s opinions. Because of the continued exclusion from being 
part of the system, many of these non-law enforcement officials surveyed felt that 
they were not able to perform their duties fully because of the lack of information.  
The delineation of authorities at each level of government allows for 
different views of information gathering and analysis. A national approach to 
sharing information must be developed and embraced to accomplish this goal. 
We should look at one system that will incorporate local, state, and national 
systems into one shared and enhanced system that will be built from the ground 
up with the goals of all in mind rather than adapting current systems. We need to 
move beyond the fusion center concept to expand the intelligence community 
beyond law enforcement and into the areas of fire service, medical community, 
utilities, and the private sector.  
By addressing two major areas of the information sharing community, the 
human element and the technical challenges, we can build a better system. The 
human element is comprised of factors that tend to prevent information sharing 
between people. The lack of trust, relationships, megacommunities, and 
leadership represent barriers to the development and sustainment of information-
sharing systems. These components are necessary to build the base for systems 
to exist. The administrators and leaders of agencies responsible for collecting 
and sharing information must buy in to the grander picture of other agencies.  
Once good human interaction has been established between agency 
leaders, there will be a building of trust between them. This philosophy must be 
pushed down through the organizations to all of those involved in making 
information sharing occur. The top-down approach to making the system work is 
vital. The understanding of the Megacommunity theory and the role it plays in 
building strength through numbers is important. As relationships are built 
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between agency personnel, the ability to better understand the needs and roles 
of other agencies will become clearer. To enhance this process, all agencies 
involved should be part of a governance structure that will guide and approve the 
processes by which the system will operate. The governance structure has to be 
made of and include all parties who are expected or need to be involved in any 
part of the information sharing process. Leadership will be an important aspect 
that the top-level administrators will have to posses and recognize. Leaders are 
said to be those people with vision and the courage to reach for their vision. 
Many times the leadership necessary for an organization to grow or change will 
come from those closest to the problem. Creative leadership is necessary in the 
information-sharing network to allow those providing the services the 
empowerment to provide the organization what it needs to be successful. 
The next level of development of the information sharing system has to be 
built around the technical aspects or components that will allow the information 
sharing to take place. These may be systems or regulations that grant access, 
process the information into a useable form or that allow personnel to follow 
federal guidelines for information handling. The first step is to investigate any 
standards or laws that apply to information and to list these, and criteria are to 
follow. This will allow boundaries to be established, which will help identify what 
can and cannot be accomplished. The next phase of the technical components 
should be the issue of interoperability and the understanding that all the agencies 
involved will need to be able to get and share information. Systems that are 
segregated or protected may need to be evaluated to reveal their true need and 
what can be adjusted to make them more accessible to others who need and 
have authority to get the information. The need to build interoperable systems is 
an important part of the system. The interoperability issue will affect the 
technology chosen. As the system is built, we must look to the standards of open 
architecture and Global XML standards so each component of the information-
sharing network can be reviewed for pertinent standards and their 
interdependencies to the entire network.  
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With technology there will need to be discussions on information 
assurance and computer security issues. Today we are seeing a new wave of 
technology that allows for integration of data into a useable format. As we work to 
become more inclusive in our preparation, prevention, response and recovery 
from events, we must look at those processes that will allow for better 
communication systems. The goal of any information system is to get information 
to those who need the information to enable them to make the most informed 
decisions possible. Critical information from many sources is imperative when 
evaluating a decision that affects different agencies. The sharing of information in 
a real time environment can be accomplished using integrated systems.  
The components that have been identified represent a vast majority of the 
areas needed to build a successful network. It is recognized that there may be 
others that were not mentioned. There are also many sub-components within 
each of the mentioned sections that could be explored and expanded upon. To 
be successful at information sharing, the need exists to recognize that we must 
look at a wide array of both human and mechanical components. These 
components all build upon each other and are interdependent to 
accomplishments of the network. Through evaluation of the components and how 
successfully we implement each of them, we can determine the likelihood of 
overall success of the network.  
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
My participation in this program began with the support and sponsorship 
of the Charlotte Fire Department and the City of Charlotte. I wish to acknowledge 
my sincere appreciation to Fire Chief Jon Hannan of the Charlotte Fire 
Department, who has been a mentor and encourager for the last eighteen 
months. Without his support and understanding, this would not have been 
possible. I would like to recognize Charlotte City Manager Curt Walton for his 
support of the Fire Department and its role as the Homeland Security Office for 
the City of Charlotte. A special “thank you” is extended as well to my fellow 
deputy chiefs and staff of the Charlotte Fire Department. Without their 
assumption of my duties throughout my in residence dates, I would not have 
been able to focus on the work at hand in the program.  
The program that has been developed by the CHDS faculty is by far the 
pinnacle of the academic community. The instructors provided me with a base of 
knowledge that could not have been explained if tried prior to starting the 
program. The in-residence sessions were an emersion of topics and issues that 
exposed me to new ways of thinking of Homeland Security. While in the program, 
I have gain immense understanding of the political, social, religious and 
operational aspects of the issue of National Security and Homeland Defense. I 
want to thank each of the members of the faculty and guest speakers who helped 
to craft my vision of Homeland Security. This was truly one of the most rewarding 
experiences of my life and will greatly affect the actions I take in my role as a 
homeland security professional. I want to personally thank Chris Bellavita and 
Richard Bergin who were much more than just members of the faculty but were 
also friends and guides to all of us, which helped to lessen the stress associated 
with the program.  
 
xvi 
Over the last 18 months of readings, postings, papers, presentations, in 
residence sessions in California and a thesis project, I have gained a new set of 
friends in my fellow students. Without their support and encouragement, I could 
not have completed the assignments or the thesis. While this program may be 
ending, the friendship and professional bond with these individuals will continue. I 
thank you for all that we have experienced together and the strength that we 
found in teamwork and support for each other. Through the time together, we 
have made each other stronger and better.  
Finally, I would like to say a special thank you to my loving wife Sandy 
who has been my biggest cheerleader of all. Thanks for the understanding of the 
long nights at the dinner table until the early hours. The lonely weeks you spent 
while I was in school in California. I want to thank you for the encouragement and 
support while working on the assignments and not being able to be with you. 
Thank you also for being there with me when I thought it was impossible and 





A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The information sharing process between the law enforcement community 
and the non-law enforcement agencies across the country has not been fulfilling 
the needs of agencies who, traditionally, have not been involved in the gathering 
and dissemination of information to support intelligence. These agencies can 
provide new and successful avenues for information gathering. In addition, there 
is a need to insure that these agencies are part of receiving important information 
in a timely manner.  
Fire service is an example of a non-law enforcement agency that is being 
excluded from information sharing with other agencies. This includes the two-way 
sharing of critical information between fire service and law enforcement. Fire 
service leaders of major metropolitan areas feel there is a lack of involvement of 
non-law enforcement agencies in the intelligence community as revealed by 
research for this thesis. This community includes fusion centers, Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces, and critical infrastructure protection planning. They do not 
participate in gathering, evaluating, and disseminating information concerning 
potential terrorism-related intelligence. Fire service agencies need intelligence to 
properly prepare and respond to threats of terrorism.  
One of the major tasks of the fire service is the pre-incident analysis, 
which takes into account several factors to determine risks and threats. These 
include the potential situation, available resources, capabilities of personnel, and 
the coordination of required agencies–all important factors that are part of the 
pre-incident analysis. Fire service provides much of the incident response 
capabilities for a weapon of mass destruction-type event, including hazardous 
materials teams, mass casualty triage, treatment, and structural collapse rescue 
teams. A terrorist attack may involve a large explosion, the release of chemicals, 
the destruction of structures, and injury to a large numbers of civilians.  
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While the fire service is only one of the non-law enforcement agencies that 
need to be included in information sharing, it is one of the most important 
because of its role as a first responder. Fire service should have the most up-to-
date intelligence on potential threats to properly plan for and prepare the 
resources needed for potential events. 
Understanding that there are several other agencies and disciplines that 
will also need information to properly prepare for an event, the need exists to 
evaluate the total picture of who needs what information. In order to make sure 
that those who have a part in the response–in either the prevention of or the 
response to an attack–we must look at a new way to assure the dissemination of 
information.  
 To accomplish this sharing of information between all agencies that 
participate in the prevention and response to terrorist attacks, we must develop a 
system that allows information to flow without barriers. This system should 
enhance information gathering and dissemination both internally and externally. 
Information sharing is supposed to take place both within the fusion centers and 
externally. While this occurs in some centers, between law enforcement agencies 
at local, state, and federal levels, the inclusion of non-law enforcement agencies 
is limited or non-existent. The need for integrated and collaborative fusion 
centers is growing, as many urban areas look to provide timely data\information 
flow between Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and the law enforcement 
communities. The National Strategy for Information Sharing, published by the 
White House in October 2007, outlined the need to develop an integrated 
network of information sharing. The Strategy recognizes the sovereignty of state 
and local governments, and thus, the roles and responsibilities are delineated by 
the understanding that state and major urban area fusion centers are owned and 
managed by state and local governments. This delineation of the authority of 
each level of government allows for different views of information gathering and 
analysis. Furthermore, the incorporation of fusion centers into the intelligence-
sharing environment takes into account that these centers support day-to-day 
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crime-control efforts and other critical public safety activities.1 Within these fusion 
centers, there is a need to expand the intelligence community beyond law 
enforcement and into the areas of fire service, medical community, utilities, and 
the private sector.  
Since fusion centers have mostly been seen as analysis centers, a new 
approach needs to be investigated that will provide these non-law enforcement 
agencies with access to the fusion center process. The fusion center process 
should include linking databases of agencies, providing direct information sharing 
between agencies, and developing specific intelligence analysis for different 
disciplines. In some fusion centers, non-law enforcement members could 
participate at a range of levels. One level is as full members of the JTTF 
executive committees, where they serve as information nodes for their 
disciplines. At another level, agencies are contacted about specific issues and 
provide technical expertise for a subject. A few centers assign members full-time 
to work side-by-side with non-law enforcement agencies.  
Building information systems and fusing them together is one of the major 
gaps identified by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (also known as the 9/11 Commission).2 A very few fusion centers have full 
participation from non-law enforcement agencies; most fusion centers include 
these agencies only as part of a data\information dissemination chain. For the 
vast majority of fusion centers there is no participation by these non-law 
enforcement agencies. This creates the need for system that is built on 
standardization of agencies and disciplines that participate and are included in 
the information sharing. Some Urban Areas have begun building information 
centers rather than fusion centers. While fusion centers are designed to receive 
information and perform analysis on it for linkage and relevance, the information 
                                            
1 United States, President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Information Sharing, The 
Whitehouse, October 2007, 10. 
2 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations (The 911 Commission 
Report, Washington, DC, 2004), 401. 
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centers act as central nodes for activities and vital information flow about 
incidents. In addition, they may serve as emergency operations centers for small 
events, which require coordination between all agencies–both law enforcement 
and non-law enforcement.   
The problem with a majority of fusion centers is that they do not include 
non-law enforcement agencies in the daily operations of information gathering 
and dissemination. This limits the fusion center’s ability to take advantage of the 
data\information assets to which these agencies may have access. While some 
centers across the country have some form of non-law enforcement participation, 
very few actually have full-time staff assigned to them from these non-law 
enforcement agencies. This lack stems from several reasons that should be 
examined by each center individually. One reason is that agencies are not being 
invited to participate due to a lack of available personnel. The lack of technology 
to support the sharing of information is also a large barrier to current fusion 
center expansion. Many times this is looked upon as an issue that is beyond the 
scope of the fusion center’s control. In its July 2007 Report for Congress, Fusion 
Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) finds that many states lack a state-wide intelligence system with access to 
databases within their jurisdiction. "Such systems are expensive and potentially 
problematic in getting all agencies with homeland security-related missions to 
adopt a particular system." The report cites one of the more advanced fusion 
centers, which reported having access to only 30 percent of law enforcement 
data in the state.3 This report suggests that some fusion centers are not 
communicating with their own disciplines very well. This is another indicator that 
there is a fundamental flaw with the basic system. This may be result of a lack of 
training as well. The Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Training  
 
 
                                            
3 Dan Thomas, “Technology Strategy for Second Generation Fusion Centers,” IPublic .org., 
March 28, 2008, 
http://www.ipublic.org/wiki/index.php/Technology_strategy_for_second_generation_fusion_centers. 
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(FLEET) Program is designed to help identify training needs with information 
sharing. This program is sponsored by the Attorney General’s Office and 
provides grants to support this training.4 
As fusion centers evolve to do more than just the analysis of crime data 
and leads, a way to receive and disseminate information through new channels 
will be needed. This will be a difficult task due to a host of issues surrounding 
privacy of information, clearances of information, and the technology to allow 
new partners to participate. This may include receiving time-sensitive 
information, which needs to be distributed immediately rather than analyzed. 
There will be a need for new technology that will encourage new partners to 
participate. This new technology may offer a faster, less involved and more cost 
effective means by which new partners could participate. Some of these new 
technologies may include secured video teleconferencing, palm devices, and 
shared portals for information exchange. 
As fusion centers gather data and information, there appears to be a lack 
of involvement by agencies that could provide support to the investigations or 
analysis. This could be in the form of information from a new, diverse, and 
previously untapped range of data sets. These could include the following. 
• Local law enforcement-related CAD, crime reports, arrests, field 
interviews, tips and confidential informants  
• Local Fire/EMS, DMV, 311, health, transportation, property owners 
and other operational systems in communities of interest  
• Information exchange with other fusion centers, critical 
infrastructure owners/operators  
• Federal information published by DHS, FBI, DOJ, CDC, intelligence 




                                            
4 Congressional Research Service, Intelligence and Information-Sharing Elements of S.4 and 
H.R1, June 26, 2007, 2. 
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• Open Source content on Internet web pages, news sites, blogs, 
RSS feeds, email messages and in office documents (Word, Excel, 
PowerPoint)  
• Commercial sources, such as D&B business data, reverse phone 
number lookup and others5 
The data and information sharing (type) governance structures, policies, 
and procedures of fusion centers will need to be evaluated to determine if they 
create inherent barriers to data and information sharing. The sharing of 
information between public and private entities is a new avenue of intelligence 
that will become even more important in the near future. The private sector can 
provide access to information that may not be available through public agencies. 
The use of new technologies may offer new ways to enable fusion centers to 
better share data and information between agencies that currently do not 
possess the means. To better facilitate data and information sharing between 
these agencies, new technologies may need to be designed with specific 
protocols and systems in mind. To accomplish this, a paradigms shift may need 
to take place among established fusion center entities. Research on the latest 
needs of local, state, and federal agencies, will need to be closely directed to 
ensure support from the established entities.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What are the human components necessary for successful data 
and information sharing between the law enforcement community 
and non-law enforcement public agencies and private sector 
partners? How do we structure a system to allow data and 
information sharing while at the same time providing the necessary 
critical information protection? 
• How can fusion centers leverage technical components such as 
technology, standard operating procedures, and interoperable 
systems to enhance data\information sharing? Specifically, how  
 
 
                                            
5 Dan Thomas, “Technology Strategy for Second Generation Fusion Centers,” IPublic .org., 
March 28, 2008, 
http://www.ipublic.org/wiki/index.php/Technology_strategy_for_second_generation_fusion_centers. 
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can various pieces of information, brought together through 
different technologies, provide interagency and private partners 
with real time personalized intelligence? 
C.  ARGUMENT 
There is a need to develop uniform methods of data and information 
sharing that will incorporate non-law enforcement and private sector activities. 
This information will represent new data sets and intelligence feeds to enhance 
the current very limited pool of information available to fusion centers. This 
information could include hazardous materials information, medical transport 
data, or property inspection data. Fusion centers must incorporate the all-
hazards and all-crimes approach in order to exploit the funding and physical 
assets assigned to them. The missions of fusion centers vary based on the 
environment in which the center operates; some have adopted an “all-crimes” 
approach, whereas others have included an “all-hazards” approach.6 The 
Strategy supports and encourages these approaches, while respecting that a 
fusion center’s mission should be defined by jurisdictional needs. Fusion centers 
need to evaluate and build successful information sharing systems that address 
all of the components identified as necessary to achieving their goals. These 
basic components are the foundation of information sharing. They include 
governance, standard operating procedures, relationships, and usage, which are 
required to be successful. The all-hazards/all-crimes approach to information 
sharing will require the inclusion of multi-disciplinary approaches in the design of 
any information sharing system whether it is located within a fusion center or 
outside. The need to utilize technology to communicate with, gather data from, or 
share information with non-law enforcement agencies has become an issue that 
must be addressed as fusion centers begin to build their agency base.  
The fusion center may also need to shoulder some new responsibilities, 
such as serving as an information center during events. The center’s existing 
                                            
6 United States, President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Information Sharing, The 
Whitehouse, October 2007, 15. 
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information-sharing network could prove to be a valuable tool. Risk assessment 
tools and site profile programs may be used to identify consequence 
management models as well. These models could be utilized to help on-scene 
commands make decisions. There is a need to bring new sources of data and 
information into the information-sharing system. These new sources can come 
from those agencies that currently are not participating in information gathering 
and dissemination.  
There needs to be a more proactive approach to engaging more 
intelligence partners in the information sharing networks of fusion centers across 
the country. This includes addressing existing barriers such as egos, technology 
differences, and personnel limitations that prevent centers from including non-law 
enforcement agencies. The assumptions of many of those surveyed felt that to 
be effective at interagency sharing of information, requires a physical presence 
within the fusion center on the part of all agency personnel. However, with the 
changes in the virtual environment in the last five years, the ability to have 
presence and access from anywhere has now become a reality. These changes 
include increased use of mobile and wireless devices to keep personnel 
constantly abreast of the latest information. In the past, personnel needed to be 
present in the fusion center to get data and information that now is available 
almost anywhere. Granted, cyber security is a high priority that has to be 
addressed; while an important factor in the information sharing system design, 
security is does not have to be a limiting factor. Information, guidance, and 
technical support exist to meet security concerns. Attitudes need to change 
regarding how we gather, share, analyze, and then distribute information once it 
is used to produce a valuable product  
Fusion centers need to change their focus from law enforcement-centric to 
become more data\information-sharing based. These centers can provide value 
by evolving into data\information centers as well as fusing information. This 
would not reduce the analysis of information but rather provide more information 
flow concerning the analysis. This will accomplish the goal of serving more 
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customers, such as non-law enforcement and private sector partners, using 
technology and collaboration processes. By including EMS, fire, public health, 
and private sector critical infrastructure partners in the data collection and 
information-sharing matrix, better collaboration can be accomplished. The data 
presented in this thesis evaluates options for sharing data and information 
among these new but supportive partners.  
D.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The analysis presented in this thesis evaluates the current status of 
information sharing and provides options for existing and future fusion centers. 
This thesis examines new ways in sharing data and information between fusion 
centers and those agencies that are not housed or located within the fusion 
center. The goal of data and information sharing is to provide those agencies the 
information that they need to make decisions in a timely manner. To accomplish 
information sharing in the field of homeland security, a more collaborative 
information-sharing system will be needed. The goal of the information-sharing 
system should be to promote information sharing across disciplines in a way that 
is responsive to the individual needs of agencies and is not limited to personnel 
having to be located within the fusion center facility.  
It is hoped that this thesis will be used to encourage further research into 
components that are both applicable and practical for implementation. From the 
data and information gathered in the course of this research, additional 
recommendations and guidelines can be developed that represent changes in 
both governance and technology capabilities. As technologies change, the 
configuration of fusion centers will need to be reevaluated. It is hoped that 
national baseline capabilities and guidelines will be modified to reflect the 
information gained through the research presented in this thesis. The linking of 
local, state, and federal fusion centers in a flexible and secure information-
sharing network should be the goal for all local, state, and federal agencies  
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involved in homeland security. The goal of this thesis is to recommend alternative 
strategies to national, state, and local homeland security officials to support and 
embrace the inclusion of new partners into the intelligence community.  
11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the available literature reveals a clear consensus that the 
events of 9/11 demonstrated the need for greater information sharing. There are 
numerous documents published by established authorities such as federal 
guidance, congressional testimony (including the 9/11 Commission), literature on 
smart practices, technical literature, and case studies of existing fusion centers. 
These materials each address specific areas of need, but fail to provide clear 
direction on how to accomplish some recommendations. Documents such as the 
9/11 Commission Report, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / Department 
of Justice (DOJ) Fusion Center Guidelines, the National Security Strategy of the 
United States, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Commission on 
Intelligence Capabilities, and testimony to Congress from FBI Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTF) representatives are among these. The literature can be 
divided into the following subcategories: work by recognized authorities, 
congressional reports, national strategy papers, technology reviews, literature on 
intelligence sharing, and national models of fusion centers. 
A.  WORK BY RECOGNIZED AUTHORITIES 
James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation suggests that state and local 
representation in the intelligence analysis process is necessary and should be 
implemented without delay.7 The National Governors Associations (NGA) Center 
for Best Practices weighed in on this topic with an issue brief entitled Establishing 
State Intelligence Fusion Centers.8 Once again, the expansion of fusion center 
participation beyond law enforcement to include non-traditional intelligence 
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Foundation, May 10, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em930.cfm/. 
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partners such as fire, EMS, public health, utilities, critical infrastructure, and the 
private sector was deemed critical. The report highlighted Arizona, Maryland, and 
Georgia as good models of state fusion centers that fully embrace other public 
safety disciplines.9 In fact, Maryland’s fusion center mission statement includes 
language specific to the issue: “for the analysis and dissemination of information 
in statewide support of law enforcement, public health and welfare, public safety 
and homeland security.”10 
The NGA issue brief made the following recommendation:  
To achieve the cross-functionality necessary for a successful fusion 
center, states should ensure that the center integrates staff from 
diverse agencies, including public safety, public health, energy, 
transportation, technology, the state national guard, etc. Although 
not all state agencies need to be part of an IFC, the centers should 
have provision to incorporate, as needed, liaisons from agencies 
with homeland security interests.11 
Even today, many state and local agencies feel that information 
dissemination is a major problem and that further enhancements are needed for 
the inclusion of non-law enforcement disciplines. Additional work needs to be 
done in this area to provide adequate guidance for local fusion center personnel 
to make good decisions. A more defined pattern for establishing the fusion center 
and its roles and responsibilities is needed.  
B.  CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS 
The 9/11 report was released after evaluation of the actions that led to the 
events which could have also prevented the attacks. The lack of information 
sharing was identified as one area that should be strengthened to prevent future 
attacks. One significant lesson learned from the events of the last seven years is 
                                            
9 National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, “Establishing State Intelligence 




10 Ibid., 7. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
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that state and local agencies are significant partners in homeland security. The 
war against terrorism has come to include more connectivity between local, state, 
and federal agencies, combining resources and intelligence for the good of all to 
provide the level of national and domestic security expected by the people of the 
United States.12  
In 2004, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was established by 
the president and the Congress “for the sharing of terrorism information in a 
manner consistent with national security and with applicable legal standards 
relating to privacy and civil liberties.”13 The ISE supports five communities–
intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs–by 
leveraging existing capabilities and aligning policies, standards, and systems to 
ensure that those responsible for combating terrorism have access to timely and 
accurate information. Numerous national initiatives have been set forth that 
provide guidance to the development of the ISE, including the December 2005 
Presidential Memorandum, which outlines guidelines and requirements to further 
the development of the ISE. Many of the results of this Memorandum were 
incorporated by the program manager of the Information Sharing Environment 
into the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan issued in 
November 2006.14 
A report prepared for Congress in 2007 by the Congressional Research 
Service stated the need to collaborate the information sharing among various 
disciplines and agencies. This report outlined the value proposition of fusion 
centers, potential risks fusion centers face, evolution of fusion centers, 
characteristics of fusion centers, funding issues, federal roles of fusion centers, 
private sector roles in fusion centers, and the challenges facing fusion centers.  
                                            
12 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Final Report on 9/11 
Commission Recommendations,” Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The 911 Commission 
Report (Washington, DC: 2004), 353-356. 
13 United States Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public 
Law 108-458-December 17, 2004. 
14 United States Department of Justice, “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban 
Area Fusion Centers,” Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, September 2008, 2. 
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The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various 
streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal 
government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a 
more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and 
communities can be developed and translated into protective action. The ultimate 
goal of fusion is to prevent manmade (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural 
disasters and manmade threats quickly and efficiently should they occur. As 
recipients of federal government-provided national intelligence, another goal of 
fusion centers is to model how events inimical to U.S. interests overseas may be 
manifested in their communities, and align protective resources accordingly. 
There are several risks to the fusion center concept–including potential privacy 
and civil liberties violations, and the possible inability of fusion centers to 
demonstrate utility in the absence of future terrorist attacks, particularly during 
periods of relative state fiscal austerity.15  
C.  NATIONAL STRATEGY 
In October 2007, the White House released the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing: Success, and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 
Information Sharing. This strategy provides the executive direction the nation 
should take in determining the need for complete and coordinated information 
sharing. The Bush Administration feels that this strategy should set stage for all 
agencies within the federal government to pursue collaboration with all partners.  
The Strategy was developed with the understanding that homeland 
security information, terrorism information, and law enforcement 
information related to terrorism can come from multiple sources, all 
levels of government, as well as from private sector organizations 
and foreign sources. Federal, State, local, and tribal government 
organizations use such information for multiple purposes. In 
addition to traditional law enforcement uses, such information is 
used to (1) support efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, (2) develop 
critical infrastructure protection and resilience plans, (3) prioritize 
                                            
15 Congressional Research Service, “A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and 
Options for Congress,” September 19, 2007, 3. 
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emergency management, response, and recovery planning 
activities, (4) devise training and exercise programs, and (5) 
determine the allocation of funding and other resources for 
homeland security-related purposes.16 
The National Strategy developed a good baseline for fusion centers to 
follow in determining the scope of their purpose. From a local perspective the 
strategy provides little guidance to shape the concept of operations that fusion 
centers should use to ensure success. The strategy does not provide the 
direction fusion centers need to become all-encompassing in their information 
sharing process. The use of technology and its benefits are not an identified part 
of the strategy.  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was released in 2006 
and outlined some of the options to be included in state and local critical 
infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) protection plans. These included the 
following areas of work: (1) ensuring collaboration with other government entities 
and the private sector using a process based on the partnership model outlined 
under the NIPP, or an abbreviated form of the model addressing just those 
sectors that are most relevant to the jurisdiction; and (2) instituting specific 
information-sharing networks, such as an information-sharing portal, for security 
partners in the jurisdiction. These types of networks allow owners and operators, 
and government entities to share best practices, provide a better understanding 
of sector and cross-sector needs, and inform collective decision-making on how 
best to utilize resources.17 
D.  TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
Not enough research has been done within the fusion center community to 
improve the technology for information dissemination in a secured fashion. This 
secured means of data sharing is necessary to support the transmission of 
                                            
16 United States, President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Information Sharing (The 
Whitehouse, October 2007), 10. 
17 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 168. 
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information within a fusion center environment. There is general agreement 
among non-law enforcement agencies that further enhancements are necessary 
to provide access. Jim McKay, of Government Technology magazine, made the 
following observation:  
Changes (in information dissemination) include improving the way 
information is shared with state and local officials–which has 
improved somewhat since 9/11, with the advent of the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) and as a result of Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces. Virtual fusion centers will require greater 
security; however, the successful use of technology to operate 
EOCs has paved the way for the use of more advanced and secure 
technology systems.18 
The current available literature on the technology being used in fusion 
centers is very limited. Many fusion centers are using some form of technology to 
share information within the fusion center or to notify members of fusion centers 
that they have new information. There are very few who have expanded beyond 
these applications to build networks outside of the traditional law-enforcement 
system. Most of the literature on the use of technology is focused on emergency 
operations centers, which share some characteristics with fusion centers. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology produced a bulletin that provides 
guidance and is helpful in determining levels and types of security. Information 
technology security product categories are covered in this document, with a 
discussion of the types of products, product characteristics, and environment 
considerations for each category.19 The building of an information or fusion 
center is a small part of information gathering and dissemination. There exists 
the need for a system to gather and distribute information in a timely manner, 
which meets all safeguards and security issues.  
                                            
18 Jim McKay, “The Security Shuffle,” Government Technology (November 4, 2005). 
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/channel_story.php/97157. 
19 Timothy Grance, Marc Stevens, and Marissa Myers, Guide to Selecting Information 
Technology Security Products: Recommendation of National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Special Publication 800-36 (Maryland, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, October 2003), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-36/NIST-SP800-36.pdf. 
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The lack of interoperability of systems in use today in different fusion 
centers is an issue that has yet to be addressed. There are areas of concern 
relating to these information management systems. Specifically, there is a lack of 
coordination regarding the adoption of such systems nationally. In many cases, 
statewide intelligence systems cannot work in conjunction with other systems 
within the state or regionally. Despite federal efforts to promote the use of 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) as the standard format across levels of 
government for justice and public safety information management systems,79 
fusion centers and states continue to purchase systems that operate using 
proprietary language and that cannot “speak” to other systems without additional 
equipment and costs. This may be due to the lack of mandatory guidance on this 
issue and other technology-related concerns. Currently, all guidance on this is 
voluntary.20  
Another issue within the technology realm is the multiple sites and 
systems that local fusion centers must log into or maintain to receive information. 
This is a major barrier to information sharing and appears in some instances to 
create silos of information that are not shared across disciplines or sectors. In 
addition to funding concerns, the most consistent and constant issue raised by 
fusion center officials relates to the plethora of competing federal information 
sharing systems. Fusion centers report numerous sites that federal agencies use 
that need to be check in order to receive information from the federal law 
enforcement and other intelligence communities. The Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) and its sister systems HSIN-Secret and Homeland 
Security Data Network (HSDN) have been the focus of much controversy in 
recent years. The lack of consolidation of information on these systems as well 
as the lack of use were a focus of a report to Congress.21 Law Enforcement 
                                            
20 Congressional Research Service, “A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and 
Options for Congress,” September 19, 2007, 8. 
21 “The Homeland Security Information Network: An Update on DHS Information Sharing 
Efforts,” Statement for the Record before the House Homeland Security Committee, 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, September 
13, 2006, 2. 
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Online (LEO), a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)-sponsored website, is an 
attempt to include FBI in state and local information sharing systems. The 
Federal Protective Service (FPS) portal and Regional Information Sharing 
Systems (RISS)–among others–are systems that are segregated in providing 
information.22 
E.  INTELLIGENCE-SHARING / FUSION CENTERS 
Jim McKee wrote that “many officials charged with protecting local 
communities continue to express frustration that intelligence is too often tardy 
and lacking detail by the time it reaches states.”23 Representative Jane Harmon, 
36th District of California, wrote in a statement to the House Sub-Committee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Risk Assessment that “These centers–
staffed by police and sheriffs’ officers, public health authorities, private sector 
representatives, and others–are an effective ‘ground up’ response to the need for 
more and better information about terrorist threats so communities can prepare 
and prevent.”24 
The lack of participation experienced by many state and local officials has 
created the push in many of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) cities to 
spend large amounts of funding to create their own information and fusion 
centers. At the UASI Conference held in Charlotte, N.C. in April 2008, many of 
the comments during the Fusion Center/Information Sharing Sessions were 
centered on the lack of participation by non-law enforcement agencies. This 
feeling of non involvement of these agencies has many federal officials, believing 
this has created discord between federal agencies and those local law 
enforcement agencies who are managing these centers. The lack of national 
                                            
22 Congressional Research Service, “A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and 
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23 Jim McKay, The Security Shuffle,” Government Technology (November 4, 2005), 
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standards for the design and operation of fusion and information centers has led 
to these centers being based on local or state decisions rather than on a national 
design.  
Col. Mike McDaniel reviewed the Michigan Intelligence Fusion Center as 
one potential fusion center design.25 The Michigan Intelligence Fusion Center 
has developed the most advanced use of virtual technology for fusion centers.26 
Their approach is to incorporate the Michigan Criminal Justice Information 
Network (MiCJIN) into the fusion center while using emergency management 
software to assign critical tasks.27 In his review, many technology uses are 
discussed that link information systems for a single point of sharing. This concept 
is one that needs to be reviewed more to determine other aspects for 
dissemination of the information generated. In the MiCJIN, the focus is on desk 
assignments to a diverse group of disciplines. This is probably the biggest leap in 
fusion center progress because it addresses the need to identify all disciplines 
and assign roles and responsibilities.  
Several articles and guides are available that identify technologies that 
offer promising solutions to gathering and sharing information and linking 
databases. There needs to be more literature on the success stories and the 
suggestions for future fusion center development. More research on centers that 
are operational and have had success is needed to provide a basis for 
operational acceptance. Because each jurisdiction is different, there needs to be 
more of a range of proven models that developing centers can review and select 
from.  
The U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative’s (Global) Fusion Center Guidelines, provides guidance to 
                                            
25 Michael C. McDaniel, Emad (Al) Shenouda, and M. John Bustria, “The Functional Desks 
as Collaborative Mechanisms in the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, Supplement no. 2 (2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=supplement.2.4. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
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ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently across the 
country as they relate to handling of information. Using the Fusion Center 
Guidelines, as well as identified best practices, federal, state, and local officials 
identified the capabilities and standards necessary for a fusion center to be 
considered capable of performing basic functions. These guidelines should be 
used to ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently, 
resulting in enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships, and 
improved crime-fighting and antiterrorism capabilities. The guidelines and related 
materials will provide assistance to centers as they prioritize and address threats 
posed in their specific jurisdictions for all crime types, including terrorism. In 
addition, the guidelines will help administrators develop policies, manage 
resources, and evaluate services associated with the jurisdiction’s fusion 
center.28  
The U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative later produced a report on the baseline capabilities for fusion centers. 
This document identifies the baseline capabilities for fusion centers and the 
operational standards necessary to achieve each of the capabilities.29 This 
document is a huge step forward in setting national standards for the building of 
fusion centers. By establishing baseline capabilities, those centers have objective 
based goals that can be measured. While this document along with its 
predecessor were leaps forward, there still exists the need to establish national 
requirements for participation in fusion centers.   
 F.  NATIONAL MODELS OF FUSION CENTERS 
The only national model to date is the Terrorism Early Warning Group 
TEWG. This was a program started in Los Angeles in 1996 to fill a gap in 
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information about terrorists and terrorist activities. The goal of the TEWG was to 
create a common operating picture for a national network of sharing terrorist 
threat- and incident-related information and intelligence.30  
The TEW concept involves the establishment of regional, multi-agency, 
multidisciplinary mechanisms for sharing, fusing, and assessing information and 
intelligence. Each individual TEW is an organization based upon collaboration 
among state, regional, and local law enforcement, fire service, health, and 
emergency management agencies and organizations. TEW groups build on the 
core competencies and missions of participating agencies. They bring together 
the players responsible for addressing terrorist threats and concerns in their 
areas of operation and to subsequently develop, process, and share the 
information needed for all phases of counterterrorist operations and with all 
relevant federal, state, regional, and local entities.31 This is a model that most 
fusion centers might look at to develop. The fusion center can take the 
collaboration of the TEW and expand upon it through greater analysis 
capabilities. Fusion centers typically house one or more analyst who can 
compare and contrast information sets as well as determine relevance to 
information.  
Besides the TEWG, no other national models are available. One of the 
problems with this lack of options is that a fully developed TEWG program is not 
feasible for many jurisdictions because of financial constraints. While there are a 
few models such as Los Angeles, Arizona, Maryland and Georgia that offer 
proven alternative solutions for fusion center inclusion of non-law enforcement 
agencies, these are exceptions to the standard state fusion center concept that 
currently is being used. When building a fusion center program, most executives 
want to base their decisions on the success of other centers before committing 
the resources and funding.  
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G.  CONCLUSION 
The need to provide new and better ways to share information has been 
addressed as a high priority by all levels of government, recognized authorities, 
and reviews of past failures. The lack of adequate literature on successful means 
to accomplish this means many developing fusion centers are struggling to 
create their identities. This will continue to be a problem until more centers are up 
and running and are able to report on their successes and failures. One avenue 
to facilitate open discussion of the issue may lie in informal networks that are 
developed by operational personnel. The hope is that platforms such as the 
National Fusion Center Conference and the Urban Area Security Initiative 
Conference will foster discussions that will foster this exchange of knowledge. 
These platforms offer opportunities for law enforcement and non-law 
enforcement agencies to exchange ideas, solutions, and experiences that can 
lead to changes in designs. The goal is to allow non-law enforcement agencies 
the opportunity to become part of the information sharing system by showing the 
relevance they bring to the total intelligence community. Through demonstration 
and examples of successful programs, the intelligence community can stretch the 
current boundaries that seem to be limited to the law enforcement community.   
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. POLICY ANALYSIS  
This thesis uses a policy analysis to research the applications of 
information sharing. The need to understand the methods of sharing information 
as well as the need to share information is analyzed to gain understanding of the 
current status of fusion center operations. Currently there are no standards for 
how fusion and information centers should design their information-sharing 
systems. While there are standards that outline the gathering, processing, and 
storage of intelligence information, there is no blueprint from the Department of 
Homeland Security or any other agency as to how fusion centers should be built 
to operate most effectively. A document published in September 2008 by Global, 
entitled Baseline Capabilities for States and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 
relates to the functions of fusion centers more than who should be participating in 
information sharing. 
B.  DATA COLLECTION 
The policy analysis for understanding the need for changes in the 
information-sharing systems between agencies and fusion centers focuses on 
current capabilities. Many of the components to successfully collect and share 
information are not being employed fully based on the data collected in the 
research for this thesis. To accomplish the analysis, the thesis uses several 
processes of research to identify what components must be understood by all 
stakeholders of the information-sharing system. Using different research tools, 
information was gathered on the current state of information sharing and then 
translated it to the next tier of qualitative analysis. This process utilized a two-part 
approach to research the status of information sharing. The first entailed 




personnel. The second was a blind survey of information users on what 
information they are currently receiving and how they interrupt the quality of that 
information. 
The population accessed for this research was individuals who have roles 
of administration or use of the information-sharing networks. This population 
includes fusion center managers, intelligence analysts, agency heads, 
emergency management directors, and prevention and response officials. This 
cross section of information producers and consumers represents the full range 
of the fusion center and response personnel. Ten currently operating fusion 
centers were selected and phone interviews were conducted with the fusion 
center manager and the person responsible for information technology.  
The fusion centers are members of the Southern Shield Fusion Center 
Group. This group represents the southeast States that are working together to 
build and share information through their fusion centers. The Southern Shield 
consortium has both small and large population states as members and so 
replicates a cross-section of fusion centers across the country.  
The respondents were sent a list of questions along with the scope of the 
thesis for all survey participants to review and prepare for the interview. The 
questions explored the operations of the fusion center and the involvement of 
agencies that do not have a physical presence in the building. The questions 
focused on exploring what technologies these fusion centers are using to 
incorporate these agencies. The participants were also queried (at a later point) 
as a review panel on the findings and recommendations. A representative from 
DHS Information and Analysis was interviewed to gain a federal perspective. 
While this information is of a classified and sensitive nature and was not included 
in the thesis, the insight gained led to further research in other areas. This 
research led to specific questions for identified participants about particular 
instances and cases that supported the research. The information that would be 
gathered would provide supporting evidence on how well information sharing is 
taking place. 
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The findings of the interviews were analyzed by comparing the responses 
using several criteria: size of the fusion center staff, number of agencies 
involved, and current level of technology used to share information outside of the 
fusion center, and who they are currently not able to share information with 
because of the lack of technology. The make up of each fusion center has a 
direct impact on the center’s priorities. The demographics of each fusion center 
were compared to the responses by each fusion center to evaluate any 
relationships that exist. The research should show where there are similar 
participation and oversight between fusion centers. Through analysis, common 
issues between all of the respondents were also identified. 
The survey respondents came from sending the survey to two different 
groups. The first is the chief executives of agencies, representing different 
disciplines from across the country in order to get a cross-section of results. 
These chief executives were drawn from the Urban Area Security (UASI) and 
State Administrative Agency (SAA) point-of-contact list provided by the 
Department of Homeland Security. The chief executives were instructed to have 
someone within their agency to complete the survey. The names and positions of 
the respondents was to be withheld from the research to ensure anonymity. The 
second group receiving the survey link was members of the UASI discussion list 
which includes over 1,500 members. Using this list, allowed for anonymity of the 
respondents because there identities would be hidden from the research. The 
information gained from these interviews and surveys identified trends across 
different fusion centers and disciplines. The interview questions allowed the 
respondent to elaborate on their specific operations and policies while 
addressing the question. In addition, the interviewees had the opportunity to add 
pertinent points that were not brought out from the questions. This allowed the 
conversations to be directed around specifics of each center. The survey was 
conducted by a response submission by the respondent to a survey tool. The 
results were collected by using a survey tool online. The potential survey 
respondents came from a large base of multi-agency and multi-discipline 
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personnel. Using the two different tools of interviews and surveys, allowed for the 
different questions to be applied in various forms. The interviews questions were 
asked if a way that did not appear to be questioning the respondents policies or 
their decisions to conduct their operations in a certain way. This was important to 
ensure that the respondents openly answered the questions and provided the 
needed information. The survey questions were arranged in a manner that had 
the respondent selecting from predefined answers. Because the survey is blind, 
respondents were able to answer questions that might be seen as harsher. This 
allowed the survey analysis to identify controversial issues in the information 
sharing community.  
The data collected through the interviews and surveys provided a picture 
of the current capabilities of the partners of these fusion centers from the 
interviewee’s perspective. Analysis of the data made it possible to derive a 
course of research to investigate possible solutions. The policy analysis made it 
possible to design the questions to better fit the respondent’s agency. 
Understanding that the desired responses may not be able to be obtained from 
the first attempts at interviews, the interviews were conducted in three phases. 
After the first phase, the findings and data were analyzed to determine the value 
of the content. From this, the design of the questions was adjusted where 
needed as was the way in which they are presented. After this adjustment, the 
second phase of interviews was conducted with a new set of interviewees. Again, 
the results were analyzed and changes were made as necessary to accomplish 
better results before the third set of interviewees were interviewed. This 
modification allowed the author to refine the focus of the interviews and achieve 
the data needed for the research. 
C.  DATA ANALYSIS 
The information from the interviews was used to identify patterns in the 
operations and policies of fusion centers. This portion of the research was an 
attempt to capture those components of fusion centers that are being done the 
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same way across centers around the country. A compare and contrast analysis 
identified the processes that are being used consistently across the different 
centers interviewed. Another aspect of the interview analysis was extracting the 
specific differences between the centers that the respondents felt made their 
center better in its function. By allowing the respondents the freedom to discuss 
specific aspects of their centers operations or policies, better data was captured 
from their perspective. This allowed for interpretation of results from the centers 
that may not be obtainable by other means. 
The survey analysis drew from a large group to establish a broader 
perspective. A trend analysis from the data can be identified for mapping across 
the different types of centers. Survey results were reviewed to identify any 
abnormalities that could flaw the results of the data. Careful evaluation of the 
questions and the resulting responses were compared to ensure that the 
questions, gave the desired response. Both the interview and the survey were 
used to evaluate the current operations of both the fusion centers and those 
constituents that rely on the fusion center for information. This two-prong 
approach gave the research project a view of each side of the information 
sharing community. The interviews represent the producers of information and 
the analysis of how it is to be used. The survey represents the consumers of 
information and how much and of what quality the products produced have. This 
methodology allowed the research to identify additional characteristics of 
information sharing and the systems that are currently being used.  
While there was a certain group identified for the interview process, some 
centers did not respond to the request to participate. One center contacted did 
not feel that this was an appropriate research project and refused to participate. 
While this is understandable, it did call to question what that center might have 
contributed to support the thesis. The survey tool response was as expected with 




the survey was heavy in the emergency management area, which could have 
been a product of those individuals who are more engaged in the homeland 
security activities in most communities.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A.  ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The process by which information is disseminated is an important part of 
the information sharing system. The Global report identified two requirements 
that should be part of the information dissemination plan.  
• The plan should be consistent with the intrastate coordination plan.  
• The plan should consider a variety of methods to distribute 
information, including a website; e-mail; secure portal; regional and 
national information sharing systems such as Regional Information 
Sharing Systems (RISS), Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and HS SLIC; pager; fax; 
telephone; video teleconferencing system; and personal contact.32 
B.  INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
The results of the interviews conducted with the fusion center directors 
showed a pattern of how most fusion centers currently operate under a law 
enforcement-centric organization. The majority of interviewees expressed 
concerns about the ability to sustain the current capacity without involving new 
agencies. The need to expand the involvement is looked at as a possible avenue 
that may provide new funding streams by involving new agencies that may 
possess other funding options.  
One fusion center director had a very unique perspective of the value of 
including non-law enforcement agencies in the collection of data.  
We do not know what we are missing until it has happened. Fusion 
centers need to get all of the information and then decide what is 
valuable at that time and what may be used later. The ability to go 
ask for information is very difficult when there is not a system and 
relationship in place that has already built the path. 
This comment demonstrates that information sharing is more about the 
ability to get information when it is needed than the actual information received. 
                                            
32 United States Department of Justice, “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban 
Area Fusion Centers,” Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, September 2008, 20. 
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Several of the interviewees’ centers did not have active participation from any 
non-law enforcement agencies, but did have contact information for those 
agencies. When asked, “who the fusion center would contact in those agencies 
not present to get information,” they did not have a specific name–merely a 
phone number of an office. This shows the need for a more formal and 
established system to ensure the appropriate person is identified for obtaining 
specific information.  
One of the persons interviewed felt that the inclusion of non-law 
enforcement agencies should be required in fusion centers with the caveat that 
those agencies be trained in intelligence analysis. This brings up an important 
point that was discussed with several of the interviewees: “What sort of training 
and qualifications should all personnel within a fusion center should have?” 
Several interviewees pointed out that there are standards in place for handling 
sensitive information and records. It was felt that all personnel should have 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, PCII training to ensure sensitivity of 
private sector information. In addition, the collection, storage, and retention of all 
materials within the fusion center must follow the requirements of 28 CFR Part 
23.33 This regulation prescribes what can and cannot be collected and how to 
protect that information from unauthorized access, theft, sabotage, fire, flood, or 
other natural or manmade disasters.  
During the interviews, several consistent factors were identified among the 
agencies involved in the interviews. These factors appear to drive the direction of 
the centers and the amount of involvement by other agencies outside of the law 
enforcement community. The directors interviewed represented law enforcement-
centric as well as all hazards-approach centers. Five distinct patterns emerged 
from these interviews. 
                                            
33 William J. Clinton, President of the United States, “Criminal Intelligence Systems 
Operating Policies,” Executive Order 12291, 1998 Policy Clarification, 1993 Revision and 
Commentary.  
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1.  The Fusion Center’s Location Influences its Major Focus 
The majority of centers located within state law enforcement agencies had 
well-established connections and information sharing systems with the federal-
level agencies, but had moderate or low connectivity with local law enforcement 
agencies. The use of emailed bulletins was the leading and most extensive 
approach to information sharing that was identified among the state fusion 
centers. Some of the centers did include non-law enforcement agencies on their 
email distribution list but did not have direct contacts to these agencies. These 
ranged from a desk number to call or a generic email address. This lack of 
specificity leads the researcher to question the effectiveness of this arrangement. 
Because of the law enforcement orientation of the center, many interviewees 
expressed a reluctance to send material to non-law enforcement agencies. One 
aspect of the fusion center’s location was the reluctance to use the center as a 
nucleus to bring outside agencies in for meetings or briefings. The location of the 
center within the building of a law enforcement agency may be inviting to law 
enforcement agencies, but it appears to be intimidating to other agencies. 
Access to the center is complicated when agency personnel must sign in and be 
escorted through the building to reach meeting rooms or the center itself. While 
security within a police or sheriff’s office is required, the location of the fusion 
center within this secured building creates additional obstacles to information 
sharing practices.  
2.  A Fusion Center’s Leadership Guides the Focus of Involving 
Agencies 
The leadership of all the centers interviewed is law enforcement-based. 
This is representative of the basic conception for current fusion centers since the 
fusion center concept was born from the law enforcement community. Only a few 
of the centers had members of non-law enforcement agencies on the 
governance boards. This lack of involvement led to the assumption that the lack 
of diversity within the oversight also limited the inclusion of other disciplines. The 
leadership of fusion centers sets the direction for how information is handled. Of 
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the directors interviewed, several reported that their leadership understood the 
need for inclusion of other agencies but did not know how to incorporate them. 
The members of these leadership teams were worried about a variety of issues 
that may have an effect on inclusion of other agencies. These issues ranged 
from security clearances to legal interpretations of the justice system. Examples 
of the latter pertained to the 28 CFR part 23 and the ability of non-law 
enforcement personnel to handle documents within a fusion center.  
3.  A Fusion Center’s Funding Stream Impacts the Involvement by 
Outside Agencies 
Most of the centers interviewed are funded by either Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness (LETPP) grants or State Homeland 
Security Grant Program (SHSGP) funding. The LETPP grant funds are for 
explicit use by law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorism. The opinion of 
most centers is that these funds do not allow the inclusion of other agencies. The 
SHSGP funds can be used to support all disciplines in the prevention of, 
preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorist acts. However, most 
of the fusion center funding from these funds is directed to analytical software or 
building the centers’ capabilities.  
4.  Products Produced by Fusions Centers are Very Generic 
Most of the centers are producing and distributing daily or weekly bulletins 
that are generic in scope. Some of the centers interviewed do build in sector-
specific information for the critical infrastructure groups. This information is 
mostly based on national threat and analysis of impact to local industries. The 
inclusion of specific details for individual sites was identified by one center. Most 
fusion centers utilized the Protective Security Advisors (PSA) to work directly with 
specific sites.  
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C.  SURVEY ANALYSIS 
The survey was conducted with responses from emergency management 
(the highest number of responses), fire service (the second highest number of 
responses), law enforcement (with an almost equal number of responses), public 
health, and emergency medical service (with significantly fewer responses). 
These results were anticipated since most of the sample pool came from or 
serves in an emergency management capacity. This also was an intentional 
aspect of participant selection; emergency management serves as the 
coordinator for all first responder agencies and is seen in most jurisdictions as 
the center point for information sharing.  
The information sharing duties among the respondents varied, with most 
being centered on homeland security, metropolitan medical response systems, 
and law enforcement intelligence as the most prevalent. Question # 3 asked for 
the respondent to specify their role in information sharing. This was the basis for 
determining to what extent the respondent was involved in information sharing. 
Question # 4 asked the respondents about their perception of the information 
sharing among organizations. Forty-five percent of the respondents felt that 
information sharing only occurred “sometimes when needed.” Twenty-five 
percent felt that information sharing occurred “low to none, when needed.” The 
responses suggest a lack of information sharing taking place among those who 
feel it is important to receive information.  
The respondents ranked the importance of components needed for 
successful information sharing in the following order: multi-agency exercises, 
multi-agency training, use of technology, Standard Operating 
Procedures/Standard Operating Guidelines, and governance. This suggests that 
agencies working together in exercises and training may increase the 
information-sharing capability and opportunities. Fifty-five percent of the 
respondents felt that these components were not taking place, which suggest 
that currently there is a lack of these components.  
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Respondents were asked about several information-sharing environments 
and how much they felt those environments were used by their agency to 
collaborate on information. The different environments were HSIN, FBI/LEO, 
JTTFs, local fusion centers, and state fusion centers. Of these information-
sharing environments, all but local fusion centers were said to be used “only 
sometimes” as avenues for information sharing. This response may be due to the 
lack of knowledge on the part of non-law enforcement agency personnel about 
some of the other environments. These environments might also be seen as law 
enforcement-only resources that cannot be accessed by other agencies. This 
response demonstrates the need to better-educate non-law enforcement 
agencies about the resources available to them. This education should be shared 
among not only the agencies but also the local and state fusion centers.  
Local fusion centers were seen to be used most of the time for obtaining 
information. This result could stem from the impression that the information is 
more pertinent to these local agencies because it is being generated on a state 
or local level. While thirty-one percent of respondents felt that the local fusion 
center is where their agency gets most of their information from, it appeared that 
there was a lack of knowledge regarding from where they can get information or 
if they are getting any information at all.  
The survey asked if the respondents felt fusion centers should be required 
to have participation from non-law enforcement agencies and information sharing 
networks. Sixty percent said that there would be increased benefit to their 
agencies in being part of a fusion center that required their participation. This 
result is not surprising when looked at from the position of the non-law 
enforcement agencies who feel that they are not being involved in information 
sharing. Eight-five percent of the respondents felt that a national intelligence and 
information sharing system should be initiated through a collaborative effort of 
local, state, and federal governments, as well as including the private sector. This 
would produce an information-sharing network that involves all sectors of 
government as well as all disciplines.  
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When questioned further regarding the development of this type of 
network, the respondents identified the top three forms of systems that should be 
built. The highest-ranking solution was an all hazards/all crimes fusion center. 
Second was information sharing networks where all disciplines have access and 
are only limited by their roles and clearances. Third was the use of terrorism 
liaison officers and fusion center liaison officers who work with the agencies. 
Along with this question, the respondents were asked “what is the most effective 
means of sharing information with trusted individuals of non-law enforcement 
agencies?” The overwhelming response was for the building of Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs) to access information sharing.  
These results point to several gaps in the information sharing community. 
These gaps seem to be a lack of information being made available to non-law 
enforcement agencies on avenues to get information, a consolidated effort by 
fusion centers to get these agencies involved, the need for specific intelligence 
briefs for different requirements of agencies, and the need for better technology 
usage to facilitate information sharing. There is also a clear need to promote 
educational opportunities regarding existing systems and to work to establish 
new networks. Throughout the survey and interviews, it was apparent that this 
issue of information sharing is very complicated and has many parts.  
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V. COMPONENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL INFORMATION 
SHARING SYSTEM 
The answers to the research questions addressed by this thesis have 
been grouped by two areas. The first includes those things that are driven by or 
require the humans involved to posses or create attitudes that are conducive to 
success. This area will carry the most weight in the recommendations presented 
in this chapter, since many of the responses were influenced by participants 
“being allowed” or “being asked or invited to participate.” This sense that the 
human control of whether or not information is shared is based on a human 
decision is why many in the non-law enforcement agencies feel they are not 
getting the needed information.  
The second answer to the research questions focuses on the technical 
aspects that will allow the sharing of information as long as the first part–the 
human element–is willing to allow it to take place. The technical aspects include 
the components that are currently available as well as suggest further research 
into future development of systems.  
The questions that drove this research project were the following. 
• What are the human components that are necessary for successful 
data and information sharing between the law enforcement 
community and those non-law enforcement public agencies and 
private sector partners?  
• How do we structure a system to enable these human components 
to allow data and information sharing while at the same time 
providing the necessary critical information protection? 
• How can fusion centers leverage the technical components such as 
technology, standard operating procedures, and interoperable 
systems to enhance data\information sharing? Specifically, how 
can various pieces of information that are brought together through 
different technologies, provide interagency and private partners 
with real time personalized intelligence? 
The recommendations made in answer to these questions can be broken 
down into two areas, as stated previously, the human element and technical 
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requirements. Each of these two areas will be addressed with components that 
will give an outline of the steps and necessary pieces that must be put together 
to complete the full model. The first research question looks at the overall need 
for components of information sharing which cross the both analysis areas. 
Some areas will be addressed in the human side of the equation while the 
technical components are addressed by looking at current standards, technology 
as well as future developments in these fields.  
A.  MEASURING SUCCESS  
There can be many necessary components for a successful system of any 
type. These can be found in numerous business models that are as different as 
the companies and leaders who built them. Through the years, many large 
businesses have changed their business models as the economy, technology, 
work force, and the consumer have changed. One of the things that have made 
many companies successful over time is their ability to be flexible and allow for 
change to take place. Companies that have been successful for several decades 
are good examples of these who have been flexible in their business model. 
Companies such as IBM, Procter and Gamble, Sears & Roebuck, and 3M are 
example of these types of companies.  
The United States government uses models to create success when 
developing new or modified plans. For example, the DHS Tactical Interoperable 
Communications Plan was used to help urban areas develop some of the 
components of their radio interoperability plan into manageable sections. Models 
are used to guide the development of an anticipated pattern to achieve 
consistent results. Although the results may be slightly different based on the 
factors used to form sections of a plan, the overall product at the end should be 
able to be compared against other programs.  
What does success look like? How do we know when we are successful in 
a project or program? Success can be defined as achieving one’s goal reaching 
the point at which a level of completeness has been obtained and the desired 
39 
outcome has been accomplished. For information sharing networks, success will 
vary based on the strategic vision. If the goal is to have the ability to call the 
members of certain agencies and tell them important information, then success 
may look like a phone tree that is accurate and updated regularly. If the vision is 
to have a network approach that automatically passes information to a group, a 
system of systems will be needed. The achievement of success will be reached 
when the strategic vision is able to be completed without additional input or 
change. Describing success is sometimes difficult, but the desired level of 
success must be able to be communicated to all those involved for a shared 
understanding.  
When conducting the interviews and research for this thesis, participants 
were asked what they thought success meant to them. All of the respondents 
saw success as the point at which their fusions centers would be able to provide 
all of their partners the information that they had received and analyzed in a 
format that was beneficial to each agency’s individual needs. This description is 
broad in scope but narrow in understanding.  
The needs of each partner are different based on the discipline and 
request for information needs. The local partners look for information that is 
specific to their jurisdiction and has relevance to an action item or being made 
aware of specific situations. These partners will measure success based on how 
quickly information is passed to them and in what form they receive it. This can 
be one of the most challenging aspects of success for a fusion center. Many 
times partners will not understand the time lag that may occur in delivery of their 
products.  
A shared understanding by all partners of the process of information 
analysis is key in shaping their views of success. Having a product of analysis 
that is useful is another key measure of success for the local partner. A blanket 
product, sent to all partners from the fusion center that does not provide specifics 
for their agencies is of lesser value than pertinent information that helps 
individual agencies make decisions. Local partners will be the biggest critics of 
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the fusion center’s operations and must be heavily involved in the development 
of success benchmarks. These benchmarks will guide the fusion center in 
identifying what the fusion center products should contain and look like.  
The staff and management of the center will also evaluate success for the 
fusion center. Processes that are difficult to perform may not achieve the desired 
results and may have a negative impact on what success looks like. This is an 
important reason that staff as well as management must work together to build 
systems that compliment the needs of those who must use them. Several of 
those interviewed commented on the need for better coordination between the 
systems and their human interfaces. While few of those interviewed said this was 
a current issue in their center, it was identified as a potential problem as the 
fusion center looked to expand to include new partners or products. For this 
reason, it is important that steps to increase information sharing must be thought 
out and mapped to achieve a successful outcome. The strategic view of the 
information-sharing network should be evaluated and adjusted regularly to see if 
success is possible in the current plan.   
B.  THE HUMAN ELEMENT  
1.  Governance 
The need for oversight and direction is a cornerstone of the development 
of any organization. The proper organization that represents all parties involved 
is a critical part of a successful program. Some urban areas have a formalized 
and established governance structures for their UASI grant programs, which 
includes the first responders and public safety organizations within the 
geographic area. Many of these demonstrate a higher level of proficiency in 
managing the UASI programs than those who have limited diversity in their 
makeup. This proficiency may be, in part, a result of the larger, more seamless 




governance structure. This correlation is based on areas with shared systems 
must have developed and adopted consensus requirements, funding strategies, 
and longer term agreements to support their systems.  
Governance refers to the establishment of a shared vision that creates an 
effective organizational structure that supports any project or initiative that seeks 
to solve issues. This effective organizational structure provides guidance and 
support through common policies, processes, and procedures. By establishing a 
common governance structure communication, coordination, and cooperation will 
be increased across the agencies and disciplines that are working to achieve an 
acceptable level of information sharing capability.  
The members of the governance group should consist of representatives 
from all entities of the pertinent public safety disciplines within the identified 
region. Members of the governance group should be representative of all first 
responders, plus emergency management and public information (media 
relations is important in a terrorism incident). The group should include the 
appropriate state and federal agency representation such as state police, FBI, 
Secret Service, etc. There may be a need to include key leaders of other city-
county agencies with certain authorities such as budget and management 
control. The group should be representative of all jurisdictions that would be 
considered for a request for information or be asked to help in any fashion. 
A formal governance structure is critical to the success of any information 
sharing system success. A major advantage will be the involvement of the high-
level administrators of the jurisdictional agencies. If each agency involved is 
required to have participation by the top-level administrator, more equality can be 
brought to the effort.  
The governance structure should be based upon a written agreement, 
among all participating agencies and organizations, which provides responsibility 
and accountability. This written agreement–which can be either a Memorandum 
of Agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding–should be reviewed by legal 
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counsel for all signatories.34 An analogy for the MOA is to think of it as outlining 
what would be included in a contract statement of work. You'll find the documents 
referred to in multiple and contradictory ways as to their use for financial 
purposes. Your command may have published guidance that specifies which 
term to use for which purpose, or your legal counsel may have specified a 
procedure to use in your case. Your best option is to see what your command is 
currently doing and follow the established practice.35 Specific responsibilities and 
rights of the participating agencies and disciplines must be clearly defined. The 
written agreement should address, among other issues the following. 
• Providing assets to the system 
• Using the assets of the system 
• Management of the assets 
• Problem identification and resolution 
• Funding requirements of participating agencies 
• Expectations of the agencies 
• Procedures for agencies to cease participation in the system 
The governance should identify the need and makeup of two important 
groups–operational and technical–that will help to identify and resolve issues as 
they arise. These two groups would report to and take direction from the 
Governance Board. The two groups would represent both the technological and 
human aspects of the system.  
a.  Working Groups 
The Operational Working Group would be responsible for 
determining the operational requirements, developing standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), and coordination of training. This group could also review 
                                            
34 These titles are interchangeable and the use of the term Agreement or Understanding 
have, in general, no special significance. In practice, the MOU is often viewed as an overarching 
document outlining goals, etc., while the MOA can be thought of as an implementing document. 
35 AT&L Knowledge Sharing System, Ask a Professor–Question & Answer Detail, Business, 
Cost Financial Management, https://akss.dau.mil/askaprof-
akss/qdetail2.aspx?cgiSubjectAreaID=15&cgiQuestionID=20023. 
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existing SOPs (and apply these as appropriate to anticipated incidents), develop 
formal written guidelines and checklists for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) and all-hazard events, and ensure that SOPs 
and checklists follow ICS/NIMS standards.  
The Operational Working Group will have to coordinate and work 
with the second group, the Technical Working Group. This group’s focus would 
be on the technology aspects of the system and how systems work together. 
This would include identifying existing technical solutions (including appropriate 
and available equipment that can be used to handle data sharing) and evaluating 
alternative solutions with regard to potential problems between software and 
hardware. The Operational Working Group should work to identify the most 
appropriate solutions that will still accomplish the goals set forth by the Technical 
Working Group. This cohesion of work between the two groups is important to 
ensure that all requirements are met. These solutions may be evaluated by 
exercises or virtual testing to ensure appropriateness for the application in the 
field. 
b.  Legal Considerations 
Legal issues that pertain to the transfer of information are an 
important part of the governance of information sharing. Many fusion centers 
enlist the participant of legal counsel to help craft and review all aspects of the 
oversight of the operations. Legal counsel will need to be involved in the 
development of the MOA/MOUs to ensure jurisdictional authority is followed. In 
addition, any rulings that have precedence on sharing of data should be reviewed 
to help in the development of the network.  
The participation by legal counsel that is educated in fusion center 
and information technology is important. Fusion center management must select 
the appropriate legal counsel to participate in the governance structure. Many of 
those who participated in the interviews stated that they had to work through 
several different attorneys to get those with the specialties needed during 
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development. No one attorney will posses all of the knowledge necessary to 
address the varying aspects of information collection, storage, dissemination, 
and technology components. As part of the governance structure, the legal 
counsel should have freedom and authority to participate in all discussions 
pertaining to the information-sharing network’s design and operations.   
2.  Relationships 
To achieve success, the information-sharing network will need to identify 
those partners that have an interest in the system. To help identify those 
partners, the mapping of potential participants from the onset will help to ensure 
a comprehensive list is developed. The direction and scope of the network will 
determine the size and makeup of the participants. A law enforcement-only 
network may be confined to those agencies who are credentialed as law 
enforcement or that serve law enforcement needs. Those networks that will 
include non-law enforcement agencies will need to do extensive mapping to see 
what agencies or disciplines will have information needs and can provide 
information to the network. These agencies or disciplines may need to be 
evaluated to define the extent of their participation as well. Some will be full 
partners in the network with decision-making authority while others may be only 
receptors of information.  
Participation by agencies or disciplines will be dependent on building on 
existing relationships or developing new ones. Relationships are based on 
understanding the needs of others as well as one’s own needs. Relationships 
with information-sharing partners are very similar to personal relationships. The 
network must be able to recognize or understand the needs of all those involved 
with the network in order to be successful.  
Building upon existing relationships is an important factor in information 
sharing. Many times informal connections between individual members of 
different agencies are used to help solve problems or to get information. The 
information-sharing network will need to establish formal intra-agency 
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relationships rather relying on informal individual relationships. Existing 
connections may be used to open doors and pave the path for development of 
the agency relationships. Deepening the relationship between agencies produces 
additional personal contacts that may be utilized later in new ways.  
Agency relationships should be built on consistent practices utilized by all 
members of each agency. How many times have two information requests 
generated a different answer from the same agency? This creates disparities in 
agency relationships and can cause degradation in the relationship. When there 
is no existing relationship with an agency, one must be built. This will require a 
variety of exercises in order to establish the groundwork for a healthy 
relationship. These exercises should include researching the needs of new 
agency partners and creating a clear understanding of what each agency does. 
Many of the fusion center interviewees expressed some knowledge of what 
other, non-participating agencies need, but did not fully understand what the 
fusion center could do additionally for these agencies. By interviewing the new 
partner and developing a better understanding of operations and systems, gaps 
in information may be identified that will facilitate a new relationship.  
3.  Megacommunities 
The building of larger relationship groups can be compared to building a 
community–a larger group that exists to provide benefit to individuals. In the book 
Megacommunity, the authors explain that there is a new way of solving problems 
that are common to multiple people or organizations. The approach spans 
business, the government, and the communities we live in to address shared 
commonalities. By looking across these different yet connected groups we see 
that each can support the other in solving a vast array of complex issues. These 
new complexities are a natural consequence of a world made smaller by greater 
integration and interdependency. Issues that arise in this environment can 
abruptly and unpredictably escalate, with a scale and magnitude that can quickly 
overwhelm the effected institutions. As a result, leaders from all three sectors of 
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the Megacommunity face a growing need to operate in a more open, distributed 
and collective manner that recognizes the shared nature of risks, rewards, and 
responsibility. Unfortunately, this type of activity is not intuitive for most leaders.36 
This view of interconnectivity has important implications for the 
information-sharing environment. The need to understand how each individual 
relationship is tied together in a Megacommunity with other relationships is 
important. As important is the fact that individual relationships within the 
Megacommunity will overlap. The power of the Megacommunity begins to take 
shape as we perform a link analysis of who we need to share information with 
and, in turn, who those groups or individuals need to share information with. 
What starts to happen is a network of groups begins to build that has no direct 
ties but is loosely connected through the Megacommunity.  
For example, the incorporation of private sector members in the 
information-sharing network produces a very short list of possible candidates that 
would be considered by most law enforcement-centric networks. When those few 
members are included and then look at who they need to share information with, 
a more free-flowing network begins to develop. It is likely that the third and fourth 
layer of contacts that a private sector partner might have could be the contacts 
that other private sector partners have as well. This loose connection might not 
be identified unless a Megacommunity is established and mapped out.  
The effects of not knowing those connections could be seen during 
Hurricane Katrina. Many public and private sector agencies relied on the same 
supply chains for many of the goods and services needed in the first few days of 
the disaster. As a result, many issues arose from not having enough sources to 
deliver or distribute the needed goods. The Megacommunity concept of info 
sharing allows agencies to identify those connections and use the strengths of 
each connection to strengthen the community as a whole.   
                                            
36 Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, 
Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today's 
Global Challenges Together (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, March 2008), 9. 
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4.  Trust 
What is the basis of a relationship that enables individuals to share 
important information? How does one know that information shared is kept to 
only those individuals who should have it?. There is one thing common to every 
individual, relationship, team, family, organization, nation, economy, and 
civilization throughout the world–one thing which, if removed, will destroy the 
most powerful government, the most successful business, the most thriving 
economy, the most influential leadership, the greatest friendship, the strongest 
character, the deepest love. On the other hand, if developed and leveraged, that 
one thing has the potential to create unparalleled success and prosperity in every 
dimension of life. Yet it is the least understood, most neglected, and most 
underestimated currency of our time. That one thing is trust.37  
In the information-sharing network a level of trust must be established 
before a relationship can be built. A Megacommunity depends on relationships, 
and the basis for connections to within this network is trust. Those in the 
information-sharing network must understand that there are several types of trust 
that have to be identified. In his book, The Speed of Trust, Stephen Covey writes 
that there are five waves of trust: self trust, relationship trust, organizational trust, 
market trust, and social trust. This trust model serves as a metaphor for how trust 
operates in our lives. It begins with each of us personally, continues into our 
relationships, expands into our organizations, extends into our marketplace 
relationships and encompasses our global society at large. This reflects the 
strength of the “inside-out” approach: to build trust with others, we must first start 
with ourselves.38 
A successful information-sharing network needs to be able to pass 
information to others and get information from others. How do we build the trust 
necessary to allow this to happen? We have all heard the saying “it is better to 
                                            
37 Stephen M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust. The One Thing That Changes Everything (New 
York: Free Press, 2006), 1. 
38 Ibid., 41. 
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give then receive” and “the best way to build trust is to give it.” In today’s law 
enforcement-centric information, sharing environments there seems to be a 
reluctance to take the first step in giving trust. In many fusion centers, the sharing 
of information outside of the center is questioned in terms of safety and security. 
What if the trust existed between those agencies and personnel within the fusion 
centers with agencies and personnel outside the center? The difference of 
having an existing relationship among the Megacommunity built on trust of the 
individuals, trust in the organization, trust in the technology used, and trust in the 
society of those members would be a powerful tool. The power of trust drives 
every decision made about sharing information in today’s world. From private 
corporations worried about competition to fusion centers concerned about 
information getting into the hands of the enemy. There exist barriers many times 
in getting the information to those who need it, in a timely and accurate fashion. 
Many times these barriers are based on a lack of trust. This is the basis of 
relationships and why it is important to establish the trust on the five layers. How 
can we build a system of establishing trust between agencies and individuals that 
opens the barriers and allows for information sharing to take place without 
hesitation or reluctance? There are ways to create individual trust through 
relationships but what is needed is more standardized organizational trust. Too 
many times in the information sharing community, we are comfortable with 
certain individuals but not the agency as a whole. What happens to the 
information sharing when that person is not available or leaves the organization? 
Does the information still get passed to the necessary end point? Effective 
information sharing relies on trust and the trust in the Megacommunity that the 
center is part of. Our goal should be to establish organizational trust where 
individuals serve mostly as the human end points. The trust should lie within the 
connections of the Megacommunity and its agency members. Systems should be 




There should also be methods in place to ensure the trust is not abused or 
broken. Through collective views of what trust is and how to protect it, all 
members will understand the importance of keeping it.  
5. Leadership 
The leadership of the member agencies of the information-sharing 
network will be an important component of the structure. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the governance of the network is a key component and that 
governance starts at the top executive level of the organization. However, 
leadership is a component that exists at all levels of the organization and can be 
found many times within informal ties. Leaders are those people with vision and 
the courage to reach for their vision. Many times the leadership necessary for an 
organization to grow or change will come from those closest to the problem. 
Creative leadership is necessary in the information-sharing network to allow 
those providing the services the empowerment to provide the organization what it 
needs to be successful.  
Effective leadership will be based on the importance of the network–not 
the individuals–to be successful. This leadership must insure that the following 
questions are answered at the lowest level; what are we accountable for, how will 
we do it, and how will we know when we have done it? While governance will set 
policies and overall direction of the organization, leaders will be the ones rowing 
the boat and pushing it forward. The leadership of the information-sharing 
network will be also need the ability to change those things that need to be 
changed. An understanding of the systems and the personnel will provide the 
best gauge of success for the leaders. This can only come from being an integral 
part of the daily process of the information-sharing network. Mid-level 
management is often entrenched in the processes that provide first-hand 
leadership decisions that make the organization function.  
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In the book Edgewalkers, the author Judi Neal talks about those people 
who can walk between two or more worlds and relate the two together. She 
describes those leaders who bring together organizations or people who can 
forge alliances and create unusual opportunities, and the abilities that are 
essential for innovation and growth.39 Leaders of information sharing networks 
will have to be able to walk the edge between their own agencies and those 
outside agencies they need to work with. Having the skills to do so will provide 
opportunities for success that cannot be written in a procedure manual or built 
into a technology. The leaders of the information-sharing network, at whichever 
level of management they are within their agency, will be critical to the success of 
the larger organization.  
C.  THE TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
The challenges to information sharing are (1) the ability to get people 
information when they need it and (2) the ability to use the information received. 
Many of the research respondents spoke of the need to incorporate multiple 
feeds of information into a global view of what is happening. As we look to 
exchange more data in different formats, we must identify the technology that will 
support the exchange. With technical requirements come human interface. This 
interface requires the determination of how the technology will be used, by whom 
the technology will be used, and the parameters within which it will be used. All of 
these are questions that must be identified and agreed upon first by those at the 
highest levels, then down through management of all agencies involved so that 
systems can be built to support the requirements. The following components 
were identified by the respondents as important to building successful technical 
systems: interoperability, standards, and the technology itself.  
                                            
39 Judi Neal, Edgewalkers: People and Organizations That Take Risks, Build Bridges, and 
Break New Ground Annotated ed. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, October 30, 2006), 25. 
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1.  Interoperability 
Interoperability refers to the ability of diverse systems and organizations to 
work together (inter-operate). The term is often used in a technical 
systems/engineering sense, or alternatively in a broad sense, taking into account 
social, political, and organizational factors that impact system-to-system 
performance.40 In the case of information-sharing systems, the need to have 
systems that are interoperable is a high value concept that must be implemented 
throughout the system. The core aspects of the system must be built around the 
ability to work with like systems as well as other systems that may provide value. 
Other systems might be in the form of data sets from other programs or systems 
that analyze the data held with the primary system itself.41  
With respect to software, the term interoperability is used to describe the 
capability of different programs to exchange data via a common set of exchange 
formats, to read and write the same file formats, and to use the same protocols. 
(The ability to execute the same binary code on different processor platforms is 
'not' contemplated by the definition of interoperability.) The lack of interoperability 
can be a consequence of a lack of attention to standardization during the design 
of a program. Indeed, interoperability is not taken for granted in the non-
standards-based portion of the computing world.42 As traditional boundaries 
between institutions and disciplines begin to blur, the need to access information 
from a wide range of sources increases. This will be both from within and outside 
of specific subject areas. In many cases, both goals and problems are similar, 
and there is much to be gained through adopting common solutions wherever 
feasible.  
 
                                            




Being seen to be interoperable is becoming increasingly important to a 
wide range of organizations. The need for information sharing systems to be 
interoperable in their administrative systems as well as the technology is one of 
the underpinnings of the framework for success. With standards such as Global 
XML the design of systems is becoming more interoperable to support open 
architecture components. The availability to access and use valuable information 
that is being made available to a wide range of users, often for the first time by 
interoperable systems will enhance the all parties capabilities. In some cases, 
this new openness is in response to a requirement for accountability to the 
stakeholders in order to make good business decisions in order to harness and 
use knowledge.  
The drive towards interoperability will lead to changes in the way the 
organization operates in other aspects as well. A change in the way an agency 
views other agencies, once they have agreed upon terms for one aspect of their 
joint operations, will lead to new and more positive opportunities to work jointly. A 
truly interoperable organization is able to maximize their value to themselves with 
internal systems but also make themselves more valuable to outside systems. 
Once an agency is able to exchange their information effectively with other 
equally interoperable bodies, new knowledge will be generated from the 
relationship between these previously unrelated sets of data. When agencies 
change internal systems and practices to make them interoperable with other 
systems, benefits for all the organizations as well as those making use of 
information that is produced cannot be measured.  
2.  Standards 
Standards establish a commonality for operating at certain levels or to a 
specified capability. A technical standard is an established norm or requirement. 
It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical 
criteria, methods, processes, and practices.43 Standards are the benchmarks for 
                                            
43 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard. 
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a process that controls the way things will be done. Many of the components of 
an information-sharing network will need to be addressed by standards. These 
could include hardware and software standards that must be met for systems to 
operate properly. Standards may relate to the components within the information-
sharing network that are controllable or those components that you must build 
the network around that are not controllable. Issues like bandwidth of network 
connections may not be able to be changed so the system you build will have to 
be adjusted to meet the fixed standard of service. Each component of the 
information-sharing network will need to be reviewed for pertinent standards and 
their interdependencies within the entire network.  
3.  Technology 
The use of technology will be one of the most important components to a 
successful information sharing network. Technology is responsible for many 
changes seen in the field of information sharing to date. As the effects of the 
attacks on 9/11 demonstrated, agencies and organizations are not talking to 
each other. While many pointed fingers at the federal government for not sharing 
information about threats and warnings, state and local levels of government took 
part in the failure that continues today. How many agencies share their data with 
other agencies within the same discipline? How many agencies share data with 
other disciplines? Many people have no idea on who can get the data or how 
they would get it if requested to.  
Technology provides connections between people and systems that 
humans alone might not be able to accomplish. Technology can conduct 
analyses of information that would take humans hundreds of times longer, if at all 
possible.  Understanding the needs of the information-sharing network requires 




Many agencies have organizational drivers, which direct the behavior of 
the organization. Some agencies use multiple technologies in their daily 
operations while some use very few. The access an agency has to technology 
will determine its ability to share information. Those members of the information-
sharing network that use very limited technology will be challenged in their ability 
to participate in the initial stages of the network and thus may be more reluctant 
to participate. In contrast, those agencies that have invested in many types of 
technology will be more accepting of participating in information transfer due to 
their knowledge and familiarity of the benefits technology can bring. This will also 
provide opportunities to research and invest in new technologies specific to the 
information-sharing network.  
Shared technology will necessitate discussions on information assurance 
and computer security issues. The type of information sharing will be dependent 
on the type of technology being used. As our society has become more 
dependent on technology, the increase in security of the information within that 
technology has increased. Many forms of interagency information sharing may 
be complicated by increased security measures. Some of these security issues 
may be addressed through standard operating procedures. Others will need 
specific attention and will drive what information is available to be shared and 
how it can be shared. Legal and authoritative regulations will need to be 
evaluated, to ensure technology systems do not violate any laws or policies. 
While this thesis does not cover the types of technologies that should be utilized 
it is important to understand that information sharing networks must share? some 
form of technology to be successful.  
4.  Standard Operating Procedures 
In the information-sharing environment, there will need to be managerial 
authority on how things are done and by whom. The use of standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), are important to ensure that personnel and member 
agencies have reached agreement on the processes. Standard operating 
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procedures can be considered formal rules and regulations that are a necessary 
part of the process of any organization to provide guidance for those expected to 
perform duties or functions. Without standard operating procedures, chaos would 
reign and no process would evolve. SOPs also communicate to members what is 
expected of their performance and eliminate any surprises for the members.  
Members of the information-sharing network may be individuals or 
agencies. The organization needs the SOPs to explain what each member’s 
responsibilities are and how they support other members. All members 
mentioned in the SOPs need to have the opportunity to participate in the 
development of the SOPs as well as comment on changes. Through participation 
in the process, member agencies have the opportunity to input their requirements 
as well as bring attention to inabilities they may have to fulfill request by other 
agencies. The development of SOPs for an information-sharing network is not a 
singular event. It will take many attempts to address all of the issues that will 
have to be identified and decided on.  
In addition, there will need to be revisions to these procedures when new 
members are identified or technology changes warrant new processes. SOPs 
must be specific to the mission and scope of the information-sharing network. 
Each procedure will need to address a section or part of the operation and not 
attempt to be too large in scale. The more finite a procedure, the easier it can be 
adopted and implemented. The need to ensure procedures do not conflict will be 
an important step in the development phase. An overall view must be taken at all 
times to provide a careful analysis of the cohesion of procedures. Standard 
Operating Procedures are meant to contribute to the effectiveness of the 
functions an organization conducts. They should not become barriers to success 
nor should they exclude individual exceptions when necessary. The success of 
the information-sharing network will rely on processes that include automation 
and the reliability that will come from these procedures.  
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5. Integrated Technologies 
The second part of the research question asked how to provide real-time 
personalized intelligence. The vision of an integrated information-sharing 
platform between multiple agencies and multiple disciplines has long been seen 
as unreachable. Today, a new wave of technology allows for integration of data 
into a useable format. As we work to become more inclusive in our preparation, 
prevention, response and recovery from events, we must look at those processes 
that will allow for better communication systems.  
The goal of any information system is to get information to those who 
need the information to enable them to make the most informed decisions 
possible. Critical information from as many sources as possible is imperative 
when evaluating a decision that affects different agencies. The sharing of 
information in a real-time environment can be accomplished using integrated 
systems. The following is a representation of how this system would share 
information through secured portal access. The diagram shows the varied points 
of data collection and storage that represent the multi-agency aspect that 


















Figure 1.   Integrated information-sharing Systems 
The challenging portion of this concept will be the transmittal of data, 
photos and live feeds from locations such as the fusion centers and emergency 
operations centers to field units. This will provide two-way interaction with 
commanders in control centers as well as provide information to decision makers 
on the scene. The goal here is to provide as much additional information as 
possible to all units responding to an incident while ensuring that all receive the 
same information. The ability to link backwards with information from the scene 
will also be needed for oversight.  
This portion of the project could be addressed using mobile data 
computers (MDCs) and commercial connectivity mediums. While MDCs are not a 
new technology, their use in the first responder community as “smart terminals’ is 
relatively new. Agencies are still looking for the best combination of technologies 
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that will provide the highest level of connectivity, bandwidth, security, and at a 
reasonable cost. As agencies work to push more data and larger images, current 
systems are restricted by bandwidth availability and the costs to provide a 
dedicated system. New products like WiMAX are providing some promising 
alternatives.44 The goal is to incorporate this new technology into daily activities. 
This will benefit the investment and provide stability to both the system and the 
users while increasing their confidence in the system. While providing high-speed 
data transfer of information we also must look at the security of these systems 
and the ease of use by everyday first responders. The benefit of real-time 
information is the ability to make decisions while monitoring the outcome of 
previous decisions. As new linkages to other data bases or sources of 
information are discovered agencies will be able to take advantage of each 
other’s systems. This is an example of how technology is changing the way 
certain duties are performed; such technology must be incorporated with strong 
vision and planning.  
6.  Protecting the Flow of Critical Information  
The second part of the first research questions relates to the protection of 
critical information through development of a structured system that will allow for 
the sharing of the information in a timely manner. The use of existing systems 
such as Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management Systems 
(C/ACAMS) a Web-enabled information services portal that helps state and local 
governments build critical infrastructure/key resource (CIKR) protection programs 
in their local jurisdictions. C/ACAMS provides a set of tools and resources that 




                                            
44 WiMAX, http://www.wimax.com/education. WiMAX is a wireless digital communications 
system, also known as IEEE 802.16, that is intended for wireless "metropolitan area networks." 
WiMAX can provide broadband wireless access (BWA) up to 30 miles (50 km) for fixed stations, 
and 3–10 miles (5–15 km) for mobile stations. In contrast, the WiFi/802.11 wireless local area 
network standard is limited in most cases to only 100–300 feet (30–100m). 
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• Collect and use CIKR asset data 
• Assess CIKR asset vulnerabilities 
• Develop all-hazards incident response and recovery plans 
• Build public-private partnerships 
Using C/ACAMS also provides state and local jurisdictions with a practical 
way to implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), including 
the NIPP Risk Management Framework.45 C/ACAMS provides a vetted process 
by which information can be securely shared with the human element 
interference once members of the community are approved. This also will allow 
the exchange to law enforcement agencies form those agencies outside 
including the Private Sector. The C/ACAMS program also uses the Protected 
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program to implement protective 
measures for accidental or intentional release of information. The Protected 
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program is an information-protection 
program that enhances information sharing between the private sector and the 
government. The Department of Homeland Security and other federal, state and 
local analysts use PCII to for the following. 
• Analyze and secure critical infrastructure and protected systems 
• Identify vulnerabilities and develop risk assessments 
• Enhance recovery preparedness measures 
If the information submitted satisfies the requirements of the Critical Information 
Act of 2002, it is protected from the following. 
• The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
• State and Local disclosure laws 
• Use in civil litigation 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information cannot be used for regulatory 
purposes and can only be accessed in accordance with strict safeguarding and 
handling requirements. Submissions that do not meet the requirements are 
                                            
45 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1190729724456.shtm. 
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destroyed or returned to the submitter. The PCII program allows both law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement personnel to have access to this 
important information. Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) may be 
accessed by federal, state or local government employees and their contractors 
who meet the requirements of the PCII Program standard access policy. Before 
accessing PCII, federal, state or local government employees or contractors 
must have the following. 
• Complete training on the proper handling and safeguarding of PCII 
• Have homeland security responsibilities 
• Have a need-to-know the specific information 
• Sign a non-disclosure agreement (non-federal employees only) 
• Be certified by the PCII Program Manager or PCII Officer 
(contractors only) 
The PCII Officer manages the PCII program in an accredited entity and 
ensures that all PCII received is used, safeguarded, stored and disseminated in 
accordance with specific procedures. Accredited entities must have a PCII 
Officer.46 
These are two examples of systems that allow users to share information 
in a secured and protected environment that exists today. The use of these tools 
can be greatly enhanced with future additions to the programs. One avenue that 
is being explored is the integration of the DHS Buffer Zone Protection Plan 
(BZPP) Program which is working with C/ACAMS to incorporate the information 
from both programs into one web portal. This will allow real time sharing of the 
information for both planning as well as in the response mode for first 
responders. The management of the security of information sharing programs is 
a necessary part of the program and must be controlled. The important aspect is 
to build the systems to encourage the human element to allow access to the 
systems through the components identified earlier in the chapter.  
                                            
46 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1193089801658.shtm. 
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D.  CONCLUSION 
While the identified components represent a vast majority of the areas 
needed to build a successful network, it is recognized that there may be others 
that were not mentioned. In addition, many sub-components within each of the 
mentioned sections upon could be explored and expanded upon. To be 
successful at information sharing, we must look at a wide array of both human 
and mechanical components. These components all build upon each other and 
are interdependent on accomplishments of previous successes. Through 
evaluation of the components and how successfully we implement each of them, 
we can determine the likelihood of overall success of the network.  
Developing strong relationships between the law enforcement community 
and the non-law enforcement agencies must be the first priority. In past years the 
segregation of these two groups in the information sharing environment has 
caused distrust and a lack of agreement between the two. To build an 
information-sharing model that works, we must establish the base, which will 
support all of the challenges and hurdles that will be encountered. The human 
element represents those things that can be controlled by human interaction. 
These components are those that can and will have to be controlled by 
administrators, chief officers, elected officials, and the other top-level managers. 
To be effective, a top-level official has to support the components both internally 
as well as externally, through demonstration of their willingness to work with 
other agencies as well as work within their own organization to establish and 
support these components. There may be some resistance from members of 
agencies as to the value or ability to support this development. This is the 
linchpin of the administrator’s support and backing. If the top-level person truly 
values the components then the organization must follow.  
When other administrators see their peers promoting these components 
then they will feel compelled to do the same. Leadership is a component that is 
needed to set the example and reach across the aisle to other organizations and 
ask them in. Showing leadership qualities will impress not only the members of 
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outside agencies but also may instill confidence within the administrators own 
organization. Governance and megacommunities will be the last to be built, once 
the other components are established. The governance structure cannot be built 
until the relationships and trust between the agency representatives has been 
built. People hesitate to reveal their weaknesses until they can trust they will not 
be taken advantage of. The governance of the information-sharing network will 
need to be representative of all the agencies and disciplines that are part of the 
Megacommunity.  
Once the first layer of the system is built on a strong foundation, the 
technical challenges can begin to be addressed. These components are ones 
that will need buy-in and support from the human element. Through components 
such as standards and interoperability, the technology can be utilized to build the 
system. Standards will give the outline of what is to be accomplished. Is the goal 
to have voice and data transfer; is there a need for video teleconferencing, or are 
there security issues and clearances that need to be addressed? The standards 
or even some federal laws will have to be addressed and followed to insure 
acceptance.  
The need is to establish and build interoperable systems to join other 
networks or systems and grow the capabilities even further. By using open 
architecture and standards-based networks, the ability to share the information 
will face fewer challenges than a non-conformant system. Once the standards 
and interoperable goals have been identified, the right technology can then be 
employed to address the needs. The system may require some research and 
development to adjust the technology to meet the specific needs but by having a 
solid support in standards and interoperability the development will be made 
much easier.  
The human element will make decisions on the technical elements much 
simpler and more focused on the needs of all parties. This will allow the system 
to be built with input and support from the megacommunities’ perspective rather 
than a single point of view. Through the development of an information sharing 
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system using this model, the potential for success will be much higher. This in 
turn will result in a greater opportunity for true collaboration between the 























Figure 2.   Information Sharing Component Model 
The information sharing component model illustrates the need for a strong 
base of human interaction to establish the foundation to build a system of 
technical support. The pillars of Governance, Relationships, Megacommunities, 
Trust, and Leadership support the interaction that members of the information 
sharing community must have to facilitate the exchange of data. The 
responsibility of the top leadership of agencies involved in Homeland Security 
Information Sharing must be understanding and responsive to the need for inter-
agency human interaction.  
The pillars built on the Technical Elements are those components that 
actually move the information between the agencies. This can only be built and 
supported once the human elements are established. The Standard Operating 
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Procedures, the Technology, and the Interoperability of all components support 
the system of information sharing with relying on the human decision making nor 
the discrimination between agencies or disciplines that might occur without the 
base of human interaction.  
Through this model, a robust and inclusive system can be built that 
includes all agencies and disciplines that are part and need to be a part of the 
information sharing community. While there may always be a need for refinement 
base on the exact system be built, the basic consideration that the interaction 
between agencies and disciplines must first be refined and built on a solid 
foundation before any other parts of the system can be established.   
65 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are those within the information-sharing network who feel the ideas 
and suggestions identified here are not feasible. In fact, some may feel that these 
new networks might be counterproductive to agencies like law enforcement and 
federal agencies, whose true goal is criminal investigations within fusion centers. 
This feeling might be from a fear of decentralization and the possible dilution of 
the information. The people who currently run or operate fusion centers often 
look upon any changes as potential breaches in security for their operations. The 
FBI is the lead agency for intelligence gathering and terrorism information 
sharing within the United States. The establishment of Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces JTTFs was an attempt to include state and local law enforcement in the 
information sharing and investigative aspects of their operations.  
Most JTTFs are 100 percent law enforcement-based, which promotes the 
inclusion of only those agencies in their information sharing networks. The 
inclusion of the other agencies from non-law enforcement disciplines identified in 
this thesis may help to open up some doors for sharing of information. While 
there may still be some areas that are not fully engaged, implementation of these 
new partners and systems will enhance the productivity of information-sharing 
networks and involvement on the part of all agencies. From the research, it was 
found that there is a reluctance to include new partners in the information-sharing 
systems for one or more of the following reasons. 
• Non-law enforcement agencies cannot provide any valuable 
information about investigations or indicators of acts of terrorism or 
other crimes 
• These new non-law enforcement agencies like fire, EMS, or public 
health do not want to participate in the fusion center process 
• All the information that these non-law enforcement agencies could 
provide could be obtained in other ways even if it takes longer to 
obtain 
• Non-law enforcement agency personnel do not have security 
clearances so they cannot be part of any analysis 
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•  There is not enough work for these agencies to be involved 
• Terrorism investigations are law enforcement-based operations that 
can be compromised by non-law enforcement agencies 
• There is not enough space available to house other agencies in the 
fusion center 
•  The relationships with others are not established or valued 
• Technology solutions are too expensive to initiate and maintain 
In fact, many of these doubts relate to the lack of research in working 
through these issues. Conducting research and a thorough evaluation of the 
needs of information sharing is something that many law enforcement-based 
fusion centers have not done. This lack understanding of the needs of the 
information-sharing system usually stems from the administrators of the fusion 
centers. Fusion center administration usually comes from backgrounds that are 
law-enforcement centric. Because of this, many have failed to see the 
possibilities that expanded capabilities of information sharing can produce.  
The sensitive nature of the information housed and processed in fusion 
centers is of great concern to all who collect, analyze, or use the information. All 
consumers and producers of information should protect the sensitivity of 
information while still making it available to those who need it in a timely manner. 
Many current fusion center configurations do not possess an information sharing 
system to get vital information to non-participating agencies in a timely fashion. 
The information sharing process is a critical part of a fusion center’s operation if 
the fusion center is to be effective. Most of the information-sharing systems that 
are currently established in fusion centers were built to share information 
between law enforcement agencies only.  
To promote information flow both between non-law enforcement agencies 
and fusion centers, current law-enforcement centric systems will need to be 
modified or new systems should be established. The goal of fusion centers 
should be to have input from a wide variety of information sources creating tips 
and leads that either support or start an investigation. This information can also 
provide the means to prevent deter or intervene into a criminal’s intent. The ideas 
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and suggestions that are identified in this thesis outline the base upon which 
these new systems can be built. The traditional fusion center of the past is 
thought of as a law enforcement only facility, which focuses only on the terrorism 
aspect of a community or state. By utilizing new and innovative thinking, the 
fusion center of the future can become more robust information-sharing system 
and less of just a facility where people work. Most fusion centers do not 
encourage contributions from non-law enforcement agencies nor do they 
currently share information with many of these agencies. The need for change 
will increase as we are called upon to do more planning and preparing for 
responses between the different agencies. By sharing information between more 
agencies, the information-sharing system becomes more diverse through the 
inclusion of more partners and hazard identification. Through incorporation of the 
components listed in the thesis, a larger approach to fusion centers can be 
established.  
One approach that can come from the inclusion of multi-discipline 
information- sharing systems is that of the All Hazards/All Crimes approach. 
Through the components of trust and technology, these non-law enforcement 
agencies can be connected through a virtual or technological connection to the 
systems within fusion centers. The administrators of current fusion centers must 
first build a trust of these new partners to establish a relationship, which will allow 
for information sharing occurring. The use of technology allows both security as 
well as access to these systems. Information technology administrators can 
track, limit, and approve all information sharing. This will serve as a positive to 
support the expansion of the number of agencies that can participate in the 
systems. This expansion will allow information sharing to develop additional roles 
for the fusion center such as supporting more natural and accidental event 
support for all agencies.  
The advantage of an All Hazards/All Crimes would be that the access to 
information and the distribution of information would be greatly increased. 
Through secured portals, more agencies would be able to provide information 
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and thus would be able to receive information. The change in direction of the 
center must first start at the top of the law enforcement agencies involved in the 
fusion centers. This includes local, state, and federal agencies that will embrace 
the value of new partners, the assets, and information that they can bring to the 
information-sharing system. As new systems are developed to share information 
in a secured and enhanced fashion, fusion centers should look at who can 
provide new avenues of information. Through relationship building, the fusion 
center can work to include an information sharing system involving new work 
process such as virtual connections to the center, which will go beyond the 
traditional aspects of intelligence collection and analysis.  
With the inclusion of the new agencies, the move to incorporate 
prevention and response activities into the daily operations of the fusion center 
will enhance the value of the investment by fusion center funding. DHS has been 
addressing the need for information sharing through both funding and technical 
assistance. The guidance from Congress has been that information sharing is an 
important part of the war on terrorism and should look for ways to increase its 
effectiveness.47 The new role of fusion centers can provide a platform to reach 
well beyond the prevention phase of their traditional interests. The need to 
address the response phase of incidents will have an impact on fusion center 
development in the future. The inclusion of duties such as development and 
maintenance of Buffer Zone Protection Plans and critical infrastructure response 
plans can provide additional work and production for fusion centers. The 
importance of having information on threats and vulnerabilities should be coupled 
with the ability to translate that into a prevention and response model. The fusion 
center provides a platform for receiving information, processing the information 
and distribution of that information in a variety of means. If threats are identified 
the fusion center can also provide a central point for coordination of assets to 
protect and respond to these threats.  
                                            
47 Congressional Research Service, “A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and 
Options for Congress,” September 19, 2007, 5. 
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The multi-discipline fusion center of the future can become the information 
and intelligence section for emergency operations centers through the incident 
command system. There will be a need for analysis of information during events 
that multi-discipline fusion centers can provide through their existing networks. 
The ability to push information out to units in the field from these centers can also 
provide an enhanced platform for an overall more effective system.  
As fusion centers look to enhance their capabilities, the inclusion of non-
law enforcement agencies in their information sharing systems will provide a 
greater capability for all types of events. Through a change in goals and 
understanding by all agencies that provide information, assets, and staff fusion 
centers can look at expanded roles and positions that make themselves a more 
valuable asset to communities and states. The key to the future success of fusion 
centers will rely on the implementation of the components of interoperability, 
governance, relationships, megacommunities, trust, standard operating 
procedures, technology, and leadership. While many current fusion centers have 
some of these components, the incorporation of the aspects of all those identified 
is needed to be successful.  
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APPENDIX A. 
The interviews for the research on this thesis were conducted by 
telephone after the subjects were sent a copy of the questionnaire. For this 
research, the respondents nor their agencies are not identified in the thesis. This 
provided for a greater dialogue with the interviewees on some subjects that might 
have been sensitive in nature. There were ten agencies selected for the 
interviews. Only eight of the ten agencies responded positively to the request for 
an interview. One agency did not respond and another refused to participate after 
getting more information on the subject of the thesis. Of the eight agencies that 
did participate in the interviews each was contacted by phone prior to being sent 
a questionnaire. This allowed for a dialogue on the nature and scope of the 
interview. A time was then set up to conduct the phone interview and the 
informed consent form was faxed back. The information obtained in the 
interviews was very positive and provided excellent feedback to support further 
research. There were ten questions on the interview, which were designed to 
allow the interviewee to provide as much information as they wished. Questioned 
asked ranged from the agencies that the center was currently sharing information 
with to the types of technology that was being used. Throughout the interviews of 
the eight agencies the questions, we refined to focus the responses to the 
desired subjects.  
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APPENDIX B. 
The survey that was conducted was based on the responses from the 
interviews. The interviews had been focused on the fusion centers who currently 
posses the information collection and dissemination processes. The intent of the 
survey was to seek responses from those outside of the fusion centers to gauge 
the effectiveness or perception of how well the fusion centers were sharing 
information. The survey was made accessible to the Urban Area Security 
Initiative list server for all state and local participants. There were no controls 
placed on who from this list could respond or direction to specific disciplines. One 
hundred forty seven responses were used in the data collection. The questions 
on the survey were developed around responses by the fusion center interviews. 
Information about the effectiveness of information sharing systems and 
participation by non-law enforcement agencies were the central focus. 
Responses supported the hypothesis that information sharing is not taking place 
as we would hope. While inside the fusion centers the perception is that they are 
getting information out, those on the outside do not feel they are getting enough 
information. The responses also indicate there is a gap in where non-law 
enforcement agencies can get information. In addition, there is a lack of the 
components identified in the recommendations of this thesis that are necessary 
for a successful information-sharing environment to exist. The survey indicates 
that there should be further research and evaluations of the current relationships 
between fusion centers and the non-law enforcement community.  
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